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ables. Section 4 analyses how a change in intensity of com-
petition affects the market outcome and thereby social wel-
fare. Finally, section 5 concludes.
Defining competition
Why do we need a new definition of competition? Some
readers may argue that market concentration (measured
by, for instance, the Herfindahl index or the concentration
ratio) is a good way to define competition. More competi-
tion then implies less market concentration. From a policy
point of view, market concentration suffices as an appro-
priate measure of competition if the focus is on stimulating
entry. If the government removes (regulatory or other)
entry barriers, more firms will enter the market, and com-
petition is enhanced. In this case, the rise in competition is
reflected in a fall in market concentration.
However, a number of policy variables influence com-
petition without directly affecting entry. For instance, liber-
alizing shop opening hours clearly increases the intensity
of competition between shops by removing (time) con-
straints on consumers’ search behavior. However, it is not
aimed at increasing the number of firms in the sector. On
the contrary, as argued below, liberalizing shopping hours
is likely to raise market concentration. Similarly, abolishing
the minimum price in the daily newspaper industry will in-
crease price competition between publishers and hence
may drive some less efficient firms out of the market,
thereby increasing market concentration.
In these two examples, policy does not affect competi-
tion by (directly) changing the number of players in the mar-
ket but by changing the way players interact. Then, a policy
change is said to enhance competition if it induces players
to act more aggressively,  lowering prices and/or increas-
ing their output levels. If competition is seen from this per-
spective (as it is in this paper), market concentration is not
a good measure of competition since market concentration
is determined endogenously by the cost and demand struc-
tures in the industry and the way firms interact.
In particular, a policy measure is said to increase the
intensity of competition in an industry, if  it meets the fol-
lowing conditions (C1)-(C4):1
(C1) reduces total industry profits,
(C2) reduces the profit level of the least efficient active
firm and increases that of the most efficient firm (the so-
called leader) if it is far enough ahead of its opponents,
(C3) increases total industry output and
(C4) reduces the output level of firms that feature much
higher costs than the leader.
This definition of competition may look unfamiliar. The
idea is that competition is defined in terms of its effects on
output and profit patterns. For instance, if all firms in the in-
dustry are homogeneous, the definition implies that stron-
ger competition raises total industry output and reduces
total industry profits.
The definition incorporates the realistic case in which
firms are heterogeneous. In that case, the definition im-
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Samenvatting
Dit artikel bespreekt een nieuwe definitie van markt-
werking, die benadrukt dat marktwerking de manier be-
invloedt waarop ondernemingen onderling concureren.
Ter illustratie van deze definitie, worden vier recente
beleidsvoorstellen besproken die meer marktwerking
beogen. Ten slotte worden de welvaarts effecten van
meer marktwerking geanalyseerd.
Introduction
Markets are generally believed to be efficient institutions in
organizing production and exchange in an economy. One
justification for this is based on the notion of competition.
Indeed, it is often claimed that ‘more competition’ makes
markets more efficient. The problem, however, is that it is
unclear what is meant by ‘more competition.’
On the one hand, there is the abstract notion of (perfect)
competition, which implies that firms act as price takers.
Although this idea has been precisely defined theoretically,
it is of little use in practice. In reality, firms do not act as price
takers, while it is unclear how competition in this sense can
be enhanced. On the other hand, there is a wide variety of
policy variables that affect competition;  at first glance,
however, it is unclear what they have in common.
This paper makes a first attempt to define competition
in such a way that one can meaningfully talk about ‘more
competition.’ Subsequently, the impact of four policy in-
struments on competition are discussed. It is argued that
these variables can be used to raise competition in the
sense defined in this paper. For instance, increasing the
number of taxi permits sold in a city intensifies competition
in the taxi market. Alternatively, liberalizing shopping hours
in the retail sector increases competition between shops.
These examples illustrate that the definition of competition
in this paper is a good starting point for analyzing the effects
of policy decisions on competition.
Finally, I analyze under which conditions more compe-
tition indeed makes markets more efficient in the sense that
it raises welfare.
This paper is structured as follows. The next section
introduces the specific concept of competition that will be
used. Section 3 illustrates this definition with policy vari-
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poses restrictions on how more intense competition affects
the production allocation of industry-wide output over ef-
ficient and inefficient firms and on how it affects the distri-
bution of profits over such firms.
Illustrating more competition
To illustrate the definition provided in the previous section,
this section considers the following four policy experi-
ments, which have received much attention in the Dutch
policy debate: abolish the minimum price in the daily news-
paper market, liberalize shop opening hours, increase the
number of taxi permits in a city, and allow workers and
firms to select their own pension fund or insurance
company.
Minimum price for newspapers
As described by Rekko (1996), the Dutch daily newspaper
market is characterized by a cartel dictating (among other
things) a minimum price for yearly subscriptions. Compe-
tition in this market can be increased by abolishing this
minimum price. What would be the effects of such a rise in
competition? First, assuming that the minimum price is not
above the price that maximizes  joint profits, one would ex-
pect total industry profits to fall. In other words, abolishing
the minimum price satisfies condition (C1). Second, abol-
ishing the minimum price will reduce the profits of the least
efficient or least popular newspapers. In fact, protecting
these weak newspapers is precisely the justification given
by the cartel for its minimum price. Further, the most popu-
lar newspaper, de Telegraaf, may profit by using very low
prices to attract readers. Such a profit gain can materialize
only if the Telegraaf is far more popular and efficient than
the other newspapers are. Indeed if all newspapers would
be equally efficient and popular, condition (C1) would im-
ply that each firm’s profits would be reduced by a rise in
competition. Furthermore, abolishing the minimum price
will result in more newspapers being sold overall. However,
if one of the weaker papers, such as het Parool, is not able
to reduce its price in line with the other papers, it may well
lose sales after the minimum price has disappeared.
Shopping hours
Allowing shops to be open in the evenings and on Sundays,
yields two effects. First, consumers have more time to buy
products and hence will spend more money. The size of this
effect is controversial. Although some proponents of this
measure claimed that this effect would be quite large, no
clear evidence exists that this is indeed the case. I focus on
the second effect related to competition. Longer shopping
hours allow consumers to search longer for the product
they desire. For expositional purposes, I’ll concentrate on
the case in which consumers search for the cheapest prod-
uct. The liberalization of shopping hours implies that firms
have to compete more aggressively on price. Since con-
sumers can spend more time to find the cheapest product,
they will visit more shops, and it thus becomes more likely
that they will find a cheaper shop. Hence each shop owner
has a larger incentive to reduce prices. Consequently, in-
dustry profits will be reduced. Furthermore, very efficient
shops will find that more consumers will visit them and buy
more from them because their efficiency allows them to set
low prices. This will increase their profits, if they are far
more efficient than their competitors. Not surprisingly,
therefore, one of the most efficient supermarket chains,
Albert Heyn, favored the liberalization of shopping hours.
Conversely, most small shops opposed this measure.
Indeed, it is likely to reduce their profits as they lose
customers to the more efficient and cheaper supermarket
chains. As noted above, the measure has boosted total
industry output but it is not clear by how much. The small
shops have seen their output levels reduced and most
of them do not even use the new possibilities of selling in
the evenings or on Sundays. For a more detailed analysis
of the economic effects of liberalizing shopping hours, see
Bernardt (1997).
Taxi permits
One measure contemplated to intensify competition in the
taxi sector, is for the government to sell more taxi permits.
This is not necessarily the same as raising the number of
firms in the taxi sector, since an existing taxi firm may buy
permits to expand its fleet. More taxis driving around im-
ply more competition and hence lower prices and industry
profits. In the taxi sector, most firms are more or less
equally efficient. There are no massive economies of scale
or scope, and taxis are rather homogeneous both in what
they offer and in what they cost. Hence, the distribution and
allocation effects between firms will be limited. Finally,
more taxis and lower prices will raise output, measured as
total taxi kilometers travelled per week.
Pension contributions
As described by Eichholtz and Koedijk (1996), firms and
employees in most Dutch industries cannot freely select
their pension fund or insurance company at which they
deposit their pension contributions. One way to enhance
competition in the pension branch would be to allow each
firm or even each employee to select their preferred pen-
sion fund or insurance company. What would be the effects
of such a policy change? First, pension funds and insurance
companies would compete more on the returns on pension
deposits. If one insurance company would be far more ef-
ficient than the other firms, it would attract more custom-
ers, thereby increasing its output and profits.2 Conversely,
firms and employees that were formerly linked to an inef-
ficient pension fund would leave this fund for a more attrac-
tive offer from other funds or insurance companies. For
such inefficient pension funds, the policy change would
reduce output. Finally, to the extent that the rise in compe-
tition raises returns on pension funds, employers and
employees might decide to increase their pension contri-
butions, thereby increasing industry output.44
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Competition and welfare
Consider a market with a number of firms, where each firm
produces its own (possibly heterogenous) product and its
production process features a per period fixed cost. Why
would the actual outcome differ from the social optimum?
I focus on five externalities associated with a rise in com-
petition, which may affect social welfare.
First, if the production process features strong econo-
mies of scale, there may be excess entry. With strong
economies of scale, a social planner prefers a small num-
ber of firms, each of which produces at low unit costs. In the
actual outcome, too many firms may have entered, each
producing at excessively high unit costs. I will call this the
economies of scale effect. Second, if firms produce differ-
entiated goods, and each firm has its own specific product,
there may be too little entry. This will happen if consumers
exhibit a strong taste for variety and firms cannot appropri-
ate the entire consumer surplus, because perfect price dis-
crimination is not possible. In this case, entry by a firm is
socially desirable but unprofitable. This is coined the
appropriability effect. Third, if the firms in the observed
outcome have monopoly power, it is likely that they pro-
duce too little output from a social point of view. This is
called the monopoly power effect. These first three effects
are well known from papers by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and
Mankiw and Whinston (1986).
The final two effects deal explicitly with the case in which
the firms in the market are heterogeneous in their efficiency
levels. In particular, if firms are not all equally efficient, there
are two additional reasons why the actual outcome may de-
viate from the social optimum. First, for a given level of total
industry output, the social planner would like to allocate
production to the most efficient firms in the market. In the
actual outcome, therefore, inefficient firms may produce
too much from a social point of view. This is called the al-
location effect. Finally, the distribution effect says that to-
tal industry profits should be distributed in such a way that
the most efficient firms enter the market. This last effect can
be found also in Vickers (1996).
To analyze the effects of competition on these externali-
ties, I return to the four policy experiments introduced in the
section above. Abolishing the minimum price in the daily
newspaper market will reduce total industry profits (see
condition (C1)). This will reduce the number of firms that
can recover their fixed costs. Hence, abolishing the mini-
mum price may force some newspapers to exit the market.
In so far as economies of scale are important in the daily
newspaper market, this will enhance welfare. Indeed, a
smaller number of firms producing at lower unit costs is
cost efficient from a social point of view. However, perhaps
more likely, if consumers appreciate the variety in newspa-
pers, the rise in competition may push some newspapers
out of the market that are no longer profitable but still so-
cially desirable. In other words, a rise in competition exac-
erbates the appropriability effect. This is, in fact, the only
welfare effect of the five above that argues against a rise in
competition. As a rise in competition increases total indus-
try output by (C3), it mitigates the lack of output due to the
monopoly power effect. Finally, because of (C2) and (C4),
a rise in competition reallocates production away from the
least towards the most efficient firms in the market and
redistributes profits in the same way. Hence, it becomes
more likely that the most efficient firms stay in the market
and will produce a large share of the output. This boosts
welfare through the allocation and distribution effects.
Similar results hold with respect to the shopping
hours,  taxi permits and pension contributions examples.
A rise in competition can reduce welfare only through the
appropriability effect. In so far as  the consumers perceive
shops, taxis and pension funds as homogeneous and only
value the best service at the lowest price, the appropriability
effect is absent. In that case, a rise in competition unam-
biguously raises welfare.
Conclusion
This article has analyzed the relationship between the in-
tensity of competition and welfare. In the policy debate it
is often unclear what people mean by competition. There-
fore, this article has proposed a precise definition, where
intensity of competition is defined in terms of its effects on
industry output and profit patterns. Four examples of actual
policy measures suggest that a rise in the intensity of com-
petition can reduce welfare only if consumers feature a
strong taste for variety. Other effects of intensified compe-
tition, such as promoting economies of scale by reducing
the number of firms in the industry, increasing total output,
and allocating production and distributing profits to the
most efficient firms, all work in the direction of enhancing
welfare.
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Notes
1 The effect of competition on firms’ incentives to improve their products and
production technology is missing here. The interested reader is referred to
Boone (1997).
2 Note that one cannot speak of profits for pension funds, since with pension
funds, unlike insurance companies, one cannot distinguish customers and
shareholders.